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WHERE ARE WE GOING?
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CANADIAN
SCHOLARSHIP ON LEGAL ETHICS
FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Andrew Flavelle Martin*
In this essay I assess and reflect on the past and future of the Canadian
literature on legal ethics and professionalism for government lawyers in
order to identify strengths and weaknesses and areas for growth and to
evaluate its long-term viability. I call for the existing and continuing first
wave of doctrinal work to be joined by a second wave of analytical and
critical work. Ultimately, I conclude that this literature is at a defining
moment and that, without timely and sustained contributions by both
academics and government lawyers, it risks failure as a meaningful area of
study.
Dans cet essai, l’auteur évalue le passé et envisage l’avenir des études
canadiennes en matière de déontologie et de professionnalisme juridiques
en ce qu’elles traitent des juristes gouvernementaux afin de déterminer ses
forces, ses faiblesses et les domaines dans lesquels elle peut se développer, et
de déterminer sa viabilité à long terme. Il recommande qu’une deuxième
vague de travaux analytiques et critiques s’ajoute à la première vague de
travaux doctrinaux en cours. Enfin, il conclut que ces études importantes
se trouvent à une croisée des chemins et que sans des apports opportuns
et durables de la part d’universitaires et de juristes gouvernementaux, elles
pourraient connaître l’échec.
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I’ve failed much more than I’ve succeeded. And each time I fail, I get my people
together, and I say, ‘Where are we going?’. And it starts to get better.1

1. Introduction
Among the Canadian legal establishment, government lawyers remain
a mystery. Their work, other than perhaps that of litigators, is largely
hidden to those on the outside. As Dodek observed just a few years ago,
“government lawyers exist in the shadows of the Canadian legal system
… [they] are both everywhere and nowhere in Canada.”2 They not only
comprise a significant proportion of the Canadian legal profession; they
play an integral role, and arguably wield tremendous influence, in Canadian
society. But until recently, they were largely ignored in the Canadian legal
ethics literature, leaving that literature glaringly incomplete.
The state of Canadian legal ethics scholarship has attracted careful and
optimistic scrutiny, going from negligible to noteworthy in less than ten
years.3 In this essay, I assess and reflect on the trajectory of the subset of
this literature focused on legal ethics and professionalism for government
lawyers. This literature has grown dramatically since its origins near the
turn of the century. Given this dramatic growth, it is timely to assess what
has been accomplished and what if anything remains to be done. Is it a
flash in the pan, a dead end, an obscure niche that has been filled? In this
essay I argue that it risks becoming those things but can still be saved as a
legitimate and important area of academic study. My goal is to facilitate

1

Sports Night, 16 May 2000, TV Series (Season 2, Episode 22, New York:
American Broadcasting Corporation, 2000). This reflection on success and failure fittingly
took place in the series finale. I use these words here, as Douglas Keesey characterizes their
use by the series’ characters, “to give … a sense of hope and direction”—as I hope this
article will do: Douglas Keesey, “A Phantom Fly and Frightening Fish: The Unconscious
Speaks in Sports Night” in Thomas Richard Fahy, ed, Considering Aaron Sorkin: Essays on
the Politics, Poetics, and Sleight of Hand in the Films and Television Series (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland & Co, 2005) 77 at 88.
2
Adam Dodek, “The ‘Unique Role’ of Government Lawyers in Canada” (2016)
49:1 Israel L Rev 23 at 24 [Dodek, “Unique”].
3
Adam M Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of Scholarship”
(2000) 50:1 UTLJ 115 [Dodek, “Search”]; Adam M Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready
for the Twenty-First Century at Last” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 [Dodek, “Ready”].
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and inspire vibrant, continuing work in this area by both government
lawyers and academics.
Research into legal ethics and professionalism for government lawyers
is important and necessary not only because of the sheer number of such
lawyers but because the contexts in which they practice raise special and
even unique issues. The success and value of the resulting literature, both
in itself and as a discrete and meaningful subset of legal ethics literature,
relies on the successful identification, appreciation, and analysis of those
special and unique issues. Without such consideration and guidance,
government lawyers are at a significant disadvantage compared to their
private sector colleagues when attempting to meet the highest standards of
conduct and fulfill their professional obligations in both letter and spirit.4
Indeed, government lawyers are more likely than their counterparts
in private practice to find that the rules of professional conduct do not
directly or adequately address their circumstances.5
This essay is organized in two parts. In Part 1, I analyze and critique
the existing Canadian literature on legal ethics for government lawyers.
Then in Part 2, I plot a path forward. Finally, I conclude by reflecting on
the implications of my analysis.
At the outset, a note about terminology is necessary. Following the
definitions in the literature, I use the phrase “government lawyers” to
mean lawyers employed by the executive branch at the federal, provincial,
and municipal levels.6 I do not include in this group Crown prosecutors,
who have a unique role and a well-established literature of their own.7
4
See e.g. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional
Conduct, Rule 3.1.1, online (pdf): <flsc.ca/> (“‘Competent lawyer’ means a lawyer who
has and applies relevant knowledge, skills and attributes in a manner appropriate to
each matter undertaken on behalf of a client and the nature and terms of the lawyer’s
engagement, including: … complying in letter and spirit with all rules pertaining to the
appropriate professional conduct of lawyers”).
5
Ibid at 6 (“Some circumstances that raise ethical considerations may be
sufficiently unique that the guidance in a rule or commentary may not answer the issue or
provide the required direction”). See e.g. Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the Intersection
of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law”
(2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1 at 11, 41–42 [Dodek, “Intersection”].
6
Municipal lawyers are sometimes deliberately excluded. See Dodek, “Unique”,
supra note 2 at 25 (insofar as the special status of government lawyers flows from their
duties as delegates of the Attorney General, for which there is no municipal equivalent,
municipal lawyers are not properly considered government lawyers).
7
Alice Woolley, “Reconceiving the Standard Conception of the Prosecutor’s Role”
(2018) 95:3 Can Bar Rev 795; Palma Paciocco, “Seeking Justice by Plea: The Prosecutor’s
Ethical Obligations During Plea Bargaining” (2017) 63:1 McGill LJ 45; Jeremy Tatum, “ReEvaluating Independence: The Emerging Problem of Crown-Police Alignment” (2012)
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Neither do I include the Attorney General, the chief law officer of the
Crown, who likewise has her own well-established literature.8 Even
with these exclusions, I acknowledge there remains some imprecision
30:2 Windsor YB Access Just 225; Stuart J Whitley, “Prosecution Ethics: A Proposal
for Formalizing Rules of Conduct” (2010) 55:4 Crim LQ 508–548 [Whitley]; Mary
Lou Dickie, “Through the Looking Glass: Ethical Responsibilities of the Crown in
Resolution Discussions in Ontario” (2005) 50:1/2 Crim LQ 128; David Layton, “The
Prosecutorial Charging Decision” (2002) 46:3/4 Crim LQ 447; Deborah MacNair, “Crown
Prosecutors and Conflict of Interest: A Canadian Perspective” (2002) 7 Can Crim L
Rev 257; John D Brooks, “Ethical Obligations of the Crown Attorney: Some Guiding
Principles and Thoughts” (2001) 50 UNBLJ 229; Michael Code, “Crown Counsel’s
Responsibilities When Advising the Police at the Pre-charge Stage” (1998) 40:3/4 Crim
LQ 326; Bruce P Archibald, “The Politics of Prosecutorial Discretion: Institutional
Structures and the Tensions Between Punitive and Restorative Paradigms of Justice”
(1998) 3 Can Crim L Rev 69; John A Sutherland, The Role of Crown Counsel: Advocate
or Minister of Justice? (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 1990) [unpublished];
David Vanek, “Prosecutorial Discretion” (1987) 30:2 Crim LQ 219; Donna C Morgan,
“Controlling Prosecutorial Powers: Judicial Review, Abuse of Process and Section 7
of the Charter” (1986) 29:1 Crim LQ 15; Priscilla Elizabeth Susan Joan Kennedy, The
Prosecutorial Power in Canada (LLM Thesis, University of Alberta, 1984) [unpublished].
8
Richard Devlin & Sarah Frame, “Economic Corruption, Political Machinations
and Legal Ethics: Correspondents’ Report from Canada” (2019) 22:1/2 Legal Ethics
94 [Devlin & Frame]; Kate Bezanson, “Constitutional or Political Crisis?: Prosecutorial
Independence, the Public Interest, and Gender in the SNC-Lavalin Affair” (2019) 52:3
UBC L Rev 76 [Bezanson]; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Legal Ethics Implications of
the SNC-Lavalin Affair for the Attorney General of Canada” (2019) 67:3 Crim LQ 161
[Martin, “SNC-Lavalin”]; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General’s Forgotten
Role as Legal Advisor to the Legislature: A Comment on Schmidt v Canada (Attorney
General)” (2019) 52:1 UBC L Rev 201; Steven Chaplin, “The Attorney General Is Not the
Legislature’s Legal Advisor” (2020) 14:2 JPPL 189; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney
General Is the Legislature’s Legal Advisor (Though Not Its Only Legal Advisor), Although
That Role Is Admittedly Problematic and Should Probably Be Abolished: A Response
to Steven Chaplin” (2020) 14:3 JPPL 62; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Minister’s Office
Lawyer: A Challenge to the Role of the Attorney General?” (2019) 12:3 JPPL 641; François
Hawkins, “Duties, Conflicts, and Politics in the Litigation Offices of the Attorney General”
(2018) 12 JPPL 193; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Immunity of the Attorney General
to Law Society Discipline” (2016) 94:2 Can Bar Rev 413; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The
Attorney General as Lawyer (?): Confidentiality upon Resignation from Cabinet” (2015)
38:1 Dal LJ 147; Brent Cotter, “The Prime Minister v the Chief Justice of Canada: The
Attorney General’s Failure of Responsibility” (2015) 18 Leg Ethics 73 [Cotter, “Failure”];
W Brent Cotter, “Ian Scott: Renaissance Man, Consummate Advocate, Attorney General
Extraordinaire” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) 202; Wilfrid Lefebvre, “The Role of the Attorney General in
Tax Litigation” (2013) 61 Can Tax J (Supp) 231; Kathryn Chan, “The Role of the Attorney
General in Charity Proceedings in Canada and in England and Wales” (2011) 89:2 Can
Bar Rev 373; Julia Rendell, The Attorney General’s Obligation to Report Breaches of Rights
in Proposed Legislation: How the Canadian and New Zealand Reporting Cultures Differ
(LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2011) [unpublished]; Mary Condon, “Commentary
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at the definitional margins. For example, judicial law clerks are typically
employed by the executive even though their client is the judiciary. As
on “Prosecutions, Politics and the Public Interest: Some Recent Developments in the
United Kingdom, Canada and Elsewhere”” (2010) 55:4 Crim LQ 479; Kent Roach,
“Prosecutorial Independence and Accountability in Terrorism Prosecutions” (2010) 55:4
Crim LQ 486; Philip C Stenning, “Prosecutions, Politics and the Public Interest: Some
Recent Developments in the United Kingdom, Canada and Elsewhere” (2010) 55:4
Crim LQ 449; Grant Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty and Discretion: The Attorney General
in the Charter Era” (2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ 773; Lori Sterling & Heather Mackay, “The
Independence of the Attorney General in the Civil Law Sphere” (2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ
891; Marc Rosenberg, “The Attorney General and the Administration of Criminal Justice”
(2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ 813 [Rosenberg]; Craig E Jones, “The Attorney General’s Standing
to Seek Relief in the Public Interest: The Evolving Doctrine of Parens Patriae” (2007)
86:1 Can Bar Rev 121; M Deborah MacNair, “In the Name of the Public Good: ‘Public
Interest’ as a Legal Standard” (2006) 10 Can Crim L Rev 175; Kent Roach, “Not Just the
Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of the Rule of Law” (2006) 31:2
Queen’s LJ 598; James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, “Aboriginal Attorney General”
(2003) 22 Windsor YB Access Just 265; Ian Binnie, “Mr. Attorney Ian Scott and the Ghost
of Sir Oliver Mowat” (2004) 22:4 Advocates’ Soc J 4; Lori Sterling & Heather MacKay,
“Constitutional Recognition of the Role of the Attorney General in Criminal Prosecutions:
Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta” (2003) 20 SCLR (2d) 169 [Sterling & Mackay]; Mark J
Freiman, “Convergence of Law and Policy and the Role of the Attorney General” (2002)
16 SCLR (2d) 335; Debra McAllister, “The Attorney General’s Role as Guardian of the
Public Interest in Charter Litigation” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 47; Graeme
Mitchell, “The Role of the Attorney General in Litigation under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: Reflections on Where We Are After Twenty Years and Where We
May Be Going” (The Isaac Pitblado Lectures, 2002); Kent Roach, “The Attorney General
and the Charter Revisited” (2000) 50:1 UTLJ 1; Susan Chapman & John McInnes, “The
Role of the Attorney-General in Constitutional Litigation: Re-Defining the Contours of
the Public Interest in a Charter Era” in Jamie Cameron, ed, The Charter’s Impact on the
Criminal Justice System (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) 201; John L J Edwards, “The Office
of Attorney General: New Levels of Public Expectations and Accountability” in Philip C
Stenning, ed, Accountability for Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995) 294; Lara Friedlander, “Must the Law Be Obeyed? The Attorney-General’s Response
to Flouting” (1995) 17 Adv Q 80; Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney General and Charter
Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator?” (1995) 5 NJCL 125; Bryce C Tingle,
“The Strange Case of the Crown Prerogative Over Private Prosecutions or Who Killed
Public Interest Law Enforcement?” (1994) 28:2 UBC L Rev 309; The Honourable Ian Scott,
“Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change in the 1980s”
(1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109; John Ll J Edwards, “The Charter, Government and the Machinery of
Justice” (1987) 36:1 UNBLJ 41; John Ll J Edwards, “The Attorney General and the Charter
of Rights” in Robert J Sharpe, ed, Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 45;
Gordon F Gregory, “The Attorney-General in Government” (1987) 36:1 UNBLJ 59; Ian G
Scott, “The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights” (1987) 29:2 Crim LQ
187; John Ll J Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics, and the Public Interest (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1984); John Ll J Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown: A Study of the
Offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England with an Account of the Office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions of England (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964).
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a result, they are not properly characterized as government lawyers.
Similarly, legal officers in the Canadian Forces are more properly
characterized as Crown servants than as government employees, and thus
are not squarely government lawyers. However, for my purposes those
lawyers can be acknowledged as government-lawyer-adjacent. As for a
definition of ‘Canadian literature’, I consider it to comprise articles and
books about Canadian law, whether published in Canada or elsewhere.
2. Analysis of the Canadian scholarship on legal ethics
for government lawyers
In this Part, I assess and analyze the existing Canadian literature on
government lawyers, with the goal of answering several key questions: who
is writing, i.e. practitioners or academics; how they are writing, i.e. their
approaches to scholarship; what they are writing about, i.e. the substantive
content; and why they are writing.
A) The birth and growth of the literature
Before I analyze the Canadian literature, I first synthesize and critique its
content. I organize this synthesis and critique into three chronological
stages.
i) 1997 to 2006: Government lawyers by government lawyers
The earliest identifiable Canadian literature on legal ethics for government
lawyers is from a speech by John Tait, then a senior adviser to the federal
Privy Council Office, published in the Commonwealth Law Bulletin under
the title “The Public Service Lawyer, Service to the Client and the Rule of
Law.”9 This speech warrants careful consideration because it introduced
several themes that continue to resonate through the literature. Indeed,
Elizabeth Sanderson considered it so foundational that she included it as
an appendix to her recent book on government lawyers.10
Tait argued that government lawyers have a higher duty, beyond
their duties as lawyers, to the rule of law—a duty as delegates of the
Minister of Justice and Attorney General that is also reflected in the
status of government lawyers as members of the public service. Indeed,
he characterized this as “the main duty” of government lawyers.11 He
9
John C Tait, “The Public Service Lawyer, Service to the Client and the Rule of
Law” (1997) 23:1/2 Commonwealth L Bull 542 [Tait].
10
Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges
of Government Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018) at 257–65 (Appendix 2)
[Sanderson].
11
Tait, supra note 9 at 544.
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encouraged government lawyers to push back against pressure to be mere
service providers, instead fulfilling their “duty … to remind governments
of their responsibilities and help prevent harm.”12 He argued that
government lawyers are “guardians of the rule of law,” a role he anchored
in the statutory duties of the Minister of Justice, and from which he derived
a responsibility to interpret the law objectively and consistently regardless
of the client’s wishes.13 He emphasized that the powers of government
lawyers are delegated from the Attorney General and Minister of Justice,
and along with those powers comes the delegated duty “to enhance
respect for the Constitution and the law.”14 He situated this duty in the
values of the public service more broadly.15 Indeed, while Tait recognized
that government lawyers have the same duties of all lawyers,16 he argued
that government lawyers also have a “higher duty … to the law and
the Constitution.”17 Tait also anchored this analysis in democracy and
“democratic values,” among other things, which previews legal academic
Allan Hutchinson’s later analysis of government lawyers.18
Tait’s three-fold understanding of government lawyers—as lawyers,
delegates of the Attorney General, and public servants—presaged the two
most influential models of government lawyers, both Adam Dodek’s “rule
of law triangle” model and Sanderson’s “three layers” model.19 His concept
of “guardians of the rule of law” would also be taken up by Dodek.20
Tait also addressed two more specific issues that appear throughout
the subsequent literature, the identity of the client—what Tait terms
a “perennial issue” for government lawyers—and the role of the public
interest.21 Tait makes clear that, while the effective client may be a
department, the ultimate client is the Crown.22 This understanding
anchored his imperative that legal advice must be consistent across
government departments.23 Unlike more recent commentators, who
12
Ibid at 543. See also at 546 (“there is a positive duty on the government lawyer to
provide good service, but it should not be at the expense of the very real corporate function
in support of the rule of law”); see also at 548 (“while service to the client is a good thing, it
is not the only thing”).
13
Ibid at 543–44.
14
Ibid at 544.
15
Ibid at 546.
16
Ibid at 543.
17
Ibid at 548.
18
Ibid at 546–47.
19
Dodek, “Intersection”, supra note 5 at 20–21; Sanderson, supra note 10 at 2.
20
Dodek, “Intersection”, supra note 5 at 29, citing Tait, supra note 9 at 543–44.
21
Tait, supra note 9 at 545.
22
Ibid at 545.
23
Ibid at 543–44.
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emphasize that it is for the client and ultimately elected officials, not the
government lawyer, to determine the public interest,24 Tait argued that
the government lawyer has a legitimate role in that determination by
ensuring the client is aware of the client’s duties.25
In the years following Tait’s speech, the Canadian literature was
dominated by Deborah MacNair, corporate counsel for the federal
Department of Justice. MacNair’s work encompassed both government
lawyers generally and the very particular—one might even say esoteric—
role of legislative counsel.
MacNair’s general work expanded on much of Tait’s speech. MacNair
characterized the identity of the client as “[t]he most basic issue for public
sector lawyers”26 and “[t]he starting point for government counsel”27 and
connected it directly to the contours of solicitor-client privilege, which
was one of her main focuses.28 She noted the important roles not only
of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, but also of the Deputy
Minister, and of government lawyers as their delegates.29 (This attention
to the Deputy Minister would lay dormant until Sanderson’s book.) She
emphasized the duties and obligations of government lawyers as members
of the public service, particularly conflicts of interest, post-service
restrictions, and political activity, and how those interacted with their
duties as lawyers.30 In doing so, MacNair foreshadowed Dodek’s “rule of
law triangle” and Sanderson’s “three layers” model.31
Whereas Tait emphasized a special duty of government lawyers to the
rule of law, MacNair was the first to explore in detail whether government
lawyers have higher ethical duties than other lawyers.32 In doing so, she
noted the complex interplay between whistleblowing and government

24
See e.g. Malliha Wilson, Taia Wong & Kevin Hille, “Professionalism and the
Public Interest” (2011) 38 Adv Q 1 [Wilson, Wong & Hille].
25
Tait, supra note 9 at 544.
26
Deborah MacNair, “The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer: From
Polyester to Silk” (2001) 50 UNBLJ 125 at 130 [MacNair, “Silk”].
27
Deborah MacNair, “In the Service of the Crown: Are Ethical Obligations
Different for Government Counsel?” (2006) 84:3 Can Bar Rev 501 at 523 [MacNair,
“Service”].
28
MacNair, “Silk”, supra note 26 at 154–58; Deborah MacNair, “Solicitor-Client
Privilege and the Crown: When is a Privilege a Privilege?” (2003) 82:2 Can Bar Rev 213
[MacNair, “Privilege”].
29
MacNair, “Silk”, supra note 26 at 133–37.
30
Ibid at 141–42, 158–64.
31
Sanderson, supra note 10 at 2; Dodek, “Intersection”, supra note 5 at 20–21.
32
MacNair, “Service”, supra note 27 at 517–23.
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lawyers’ obligations of confidentiality,33 a topic that Dodek would later
consider.34 MacNair’s nuanced conclusion was that while government
lawyers had “other duties,” these did not comprise “enforceable higher or
special ethical duties.”35
MacNair also wrote an exhaustive analysis of solicitor-client privilege
in the government context.36 Her analysis was rooted in the unique nature
of the Crown as client, both at common law and in statute. In this way it
would presage the later literature’s fixation with the identity of the client
and its special implications.
A special focus of MacNair’s work was legislative counsel.37 While she
asserted that legislative drafters may not always be lawyers and drafting
might not qualify as the practice of law,38 and she argued that law societies
may lack jurisdiction over legislative counsel,39 she focused (as in her other
work) on how the duties of legislative counsel as public servants interact
with their duties as lawyers.40 In her LLM thesis, she went further and
argued, based on these issues of confidentiality and privilege and conflicts
of interest, that specific rules for legislative counsel (particularly on the
identity of the client, confidentiality, and privilege) should be added to the
rules of professional conduct.41
In addition to her focus on legislative counsel, MacNair also
highlighted another often-forgotten subset of government lawyers that
she termed “policy lawyers,” being those lawyers who advise on legislative
and policy proposals within the authority of the Minister of Justice.42

33

Ibid at 522.
See below note 67 and accompanying text.
35
MacNair, “Service”, supra note 27 at 528.
36
MacNair, “Privilege”, supra note 28.
37
Deborah MacNair, “Legislative Drafters: A Discussion of Ethical Standards
from a Canadian Perspective” (2003) 24:2 Stat L Rev 125 [MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”];
M Deborah MacNair, The Case for Introducing Specific Ethical Standards for Legislative
Drafters (LLM Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2000) [unpublished], online: <ruor.uottawa.
ca > [MacNair, The Case]; see also MacNair, “Silk”, supra note 26 at 148–50.
38
MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”, supra note 37 at 131.
39
Ibid at 134–36.
40
Ibid at 141–48 (conflicts of interest), 149–54 (confidentiality and privilege).
41
MacNair, The Case, supra note 37.
42
MacNair, “Silk”, supra note 26 at 151–52.
34
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After this mention by MacNair,43 policy lawyers would not reappear in
the literature until a footnote in 2016.44
Conspicuous by their absence in this first stage are academics. With
some assist from Tait, MacNair was essentially toiling alone, building the
foundational literature one piece at a time.
ii) 2006 to 2010: Enter the academics
After MacNair’s cluster of work came a stage in which practitioners were
joined by academics Brent Cotter, Allan Hutchinson, and Adam Dodek.
Whereas Cotter had served as Deputy Attorney General in Saskatchewan,45
and Dodek as chief of staff to Ontario Attorney General Michael Bryant,46
Hutchinson alone had no significant experience in government.47 It
is unclear what inspired Cotter, Hutchinson, or Dodek to write about
government lawyers at this time. By 2008, Cotter had been Dean at the
Saskatchewan College of Law for almost four years. Dodek had entered
the academy immediately after his service to Bryant and indeed had been
in the academy for only two years by the time he published his article,
suggesting that it was one of his first major projects as an academic.48
The closest thing to an explanation comes from Hutchinson, who merely
asserted that scholarly attention was “more than timely … as the number
and importance of government lawyers continue to grow.”49
Cotter argued that the identity of the client imposed a special “public
interest” duty on government lawyers, which he termed a “duty of fair
dealing.”50 He explained that governments represent all their citizens and
43
Noted in passing, but not expanded on, in Joshua Wilner, “Service to the Nation:
A Living Legal Value for Justice Lawyers in Canada” (2009) 32:1 Dal LJ 177 at 182 [Wilner,
“Service”].
44
Dodek, “Unique”, supra note 2 at 25, fn 13 (“These lawyers are not providing
‘legal’ advice or services when they are providing policy advice”). Oddly, see Dodek,
“Intersection”, supra note 5 at 26 (identifying “policy development” as an “advisory
function” and a “government lawyering activit[y]”).
45
See his academic bio at <https://law.usask.ca/people/faculty/w-brent-cotter.
php>.
46
See his academic bio at <https://commonlaw.uottawa.ca/en/people/dodekadam>.
47
See his academic bio at <https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/faculty-and-staff/
hutchinson-allan-c/>.
48
Dodek, “Intersection”, supra note 5 at 1, n *.
49
Allan C Hutchinson, “‘In the Public Interest’: The Responsibilities and Rights of
Government Lawyers” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 106 [Hutchinson].
50
Brent Cotter, “Lawyers Representing Public Government and a ‘Duty of
Fair Dealing’” (paper presented at the Alberta Law Conference of the Canadian Bar
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thus owe a special duty of fairness to those citizens, particularly those in
conflict or adversarial proceedings with the government, which becomes
a duty of government lawyers.51 Cotter’s account would gain little traction
(or even mention) in the subsequent literature but was a novel application
of the concept of the public interest.
Hutchinson argued that government lawyers have a special “obligation
to consider the public interest.”52 Unlike Tait, who did not weigh or
rank the duties of government lawyers as lawyers against their duties as
public servants, Hutchinson argued that “all government lawyers … are
government bureaucrats first and lawyers only second.”53 He anchored his
public interest claim in what he described as “a democratic appreciation of
the public interest.”54 He argued that it is for the government as client to
determine the public interest and thus government lawyers must advance
the client’s positions and decisions with the same resolute advocacy as
lawyers in private practice.55 In contrast, Hutchinson argued from the
same premises that government lawyers should have a lesser obligation of
confidentiality than lawyers generally, and should breach confidentiality
when such a breach is in the public interest.56 He situated confidentiality
in the “protec[tion] of the relatively powerless citizen against the state”57
and emphasized the importance of transparency in government.58 While
Hutchinson’s perspective on the public interest was followed at least
implicitly in subsequent literature, his creative account of confidentiality
garnered significant criticism and no endorsement.59 Ironically it was
Hutchinson, the one author in this area without a significant background
in government practice, who coined the phrase “the orphans of legal
ethics” to describe government lawyers.60

Alice Woolley, Richard Devlin & Brent Cotter, eds, Lawyers’ Ethics and Professional
Regulation, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2021) 473 at 491-95 [Cotter, “Fair
Dealing”] (Now Senator Cotter). I do not separately consider an article by Cotter in which
he makes similar arguments but focuses on duties of governments, not their lawyers: W
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upon Their Roles and Responsibilities (2007) 2 JPPL 63.
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Hutchinson, supra note 49 at 114.
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Ibid at 115 (Hutchinson includes Crown prosecutors in this claim, which is a
more controversial claim that I leave for another day).
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Dodek’s main contribution was his argument that government
lawyers have a higher professional duty as “custodians of the rule of
law.”61 Like Hutchinson’s view of confidentiality, this idea would become
controversial among government lawyers.62 As had Tait, Dodek explained
that while the effective client may be a department, the ultimate client
is the Crown.63 (He also characterized government lawyers as “rightly
obsessed with the question of who is their client.”)64 Indeed, Dodek
went further and argued that the identity of the Crown as client is
“[t]he defining characteristic of government lawyers.”65 He focused on the
complex interplay between government lawyers as lawyers and as public
servants,66 giving whistleblowing as one example,67 and the implications
of their role as delegates of the Attorney General.68 Dodek’s conceptual
model was his “rule of law triangle,” comprised of government lawyers’
status as lawyers, as members of the public service, and as delegates of the
Attorney General.69 Like Tait before him, Dodek anchored the delegated
duty of government lawyers to the rule of law in the statutory duty of the
Attorney General to ensure that public affairs are conducted lawfully.70
Building on his articulation of the special role of government
lawyers, Dodek also proposed a more active role for governments in the
regulation of their lawyers. He argued that governments should adopt—
and make public—specific codes of conduct for their lawyers.71 Contrast
here MacNair, who argued for specific rules for legislative counsel to be
added to the rules of professional conduct enforced by law societies,72
as opposed to Dodek’s argument that governments should develop
separate codes of their own, enforceable internally.73 Dodek also argued
that governments should create offices of professional responsibility for
their lawyers following the US federal model.74 While this proposal was
largely ignored in the subsequent literature,75 it was essentially adopted
61
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But see Eric Pierre Boucher, “Civil Crown Counsel: Lore Masters of the Rule of
Law” (2018) 12 JPPL 463 at 486–87 [Boucher, “Lore”].
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by the government of Canada—making Dodek’s piece arguably the most
concretely influential one among the entire literature.
In addition to their substantive importance, these pieces by Cotter,
Hutchinson, and Dodek arguably played a signalling function in
introducing legal ethics for government lawyers as a legitimate area of
academic attention. However, these three academics wrote no further on
legal ethics for government lawyers, with the exception of a 2016 piece
by Dodek that largely echoed his initial work.76 Thus, while their work
provoked controversy and dialogue, it is a dialogue in which they largely
did not continue to participate.
Alongside these foundational pieces by academics came two pieces
by practitioners. One by John Mark Keyes, then Chief Legislative Counsel
for the Government of Canada, built on MacNair’s work on ethics for
legislative counsel.77 Like MacNair, Keyes focused on the interaction
between duties as lawyers and duties as public servants, in the specific
contexts of conflicts of interest and confidentiality.78 Keyes added to these
two aspects the unique attribute of legislative counsel as “guardians of the
statute book,”79 which he positioned as being in “tension” with the other
two aspects—albeit characterizing that tension as “not such a bad thing.”80
While Keyes covered much of the same ground as MacNair had in her
examination of legislative counsel, Keyes’ contribution was an added level
of depth and detail.
The other piece by a practitioner during this time was by Joshua
Wilner.81 Wilner’s work is noteworthy because it was the first philosophical
approach to legal ethics for government lawyers, with a particular focus
on virtue ethics. Wilner grounded his account in a value he identified
as “service to the nation,” in which he wrestled with the impact of the
identity of the client and the role of the public interest.82 While writing
before Dodek set out his “rule of law triangle,” Wilner too recognized
that government lawyers are simultaneously lawyers, public servants, and
delegates of the Attorney General.83
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This second stage was characterized by the presence of academics.
Building on the work of Tait and MacNair, though in some cases more
implicitly than explicitly, they made a handful of radical proposals that
would shake up government lawyers in the years to come.
iii) 2011 to 2020: A decade of rapid growth and of dialogue
The last decade is the stage in which true dialogue emerged in the literature.
This work was authored by a mix of government lawyers—some with
experience as academics—and academics with experience as government
lawyers. Among this literature the work of Elizabeth Sanderson and of
Patrick Monahan stands out the most, but several other pieces are worth
noting.
Sanderson, formerly a federal Assistant Deputy Attorney General and
the Deputy Minister of Justice for Nunavut, wrote the first comprehensive
Canadian book on legal ethics for government lawyers. While Government
Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government Lawyers has
been reviewed elsewhere,84 it merits careful attention here. Arguably the
most important element of the book is Sanderson’s model of government
lawyers as having three “layers” of duties: as lawyers, as delegates of the
Attorney General, and as public servants.85 Like other foundational work
before her, but in more detail, Sanderson focused on the identity of the
client (“the old chestnut”),86 the role of government lawyers as “guardians
of the rule of law,”87 the role of the public interest,88 conflicts of interest,89
and confidentiality and privilege.90 To this she added an analysis of the
role of the Deputy Attorney General and Minister of Justice,91 which
had been essentially ignored since Tait’s speech, and a timely reflection

84
Sanderson, supra note 10; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Orphans No More: A
Review of Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges of
Government Lawyers” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 575 [Martin, “Sanderson Review”]; Eric Boucher,
“Review of: Elizabeth Sanderson, Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government Lawyers”
(2019) 13 JPPL 199 [Boucher, “Sanderson Review”].
85
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Ibid at 100–07.
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Ibid at 91–99.
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on reconciliation.92 The book is thus a comprehensive, if not exhaustive,
account of legal ethics for government lawyers.
Aside from its substantive contributions, Sanderson’s book by its mere
existence arguably served a signalling function, recognizing government
lawyers as a key element of the profession and legitimizing legal ethics for
government lawyers as an area of study.93
The importance of Patrick Monahan’s piece, “‘In the Public Interest’:
Understanding the Special Role of the Government Lawyer,” lies less in its
content than in its authorship.94 Monahan propounded a fairly traditional
conception of the role of the government lawyer, anchored in the public
interest—“the foundational principle that guides and structures the
special role of government lawyers”—and the rule of law which, like Tait
and Dodek, he rooted in the statutory duties of the Attorney General.95
Like Tait, he emphasized the importance of “principled consistency” in
the legal advice given by government lawyers.96 Monahan had been the
Dean at Osgoode Hall Law School, but at the time of publication he was
the Deputy Attorney General for Ontario. While the article features the
typical disclaimer (“[t]he views expressed are those of the author alone
and should not be attributed to the Ministry of the Attorney General or
the Government of Ontario”97), there is weight and significance to the
piece nonetheless. Presumably these views influenced his oversight of the
Ministry and percolated down through management to line lawyers.
During this time, Monahan and Sanderson were far from the only
current or former government lawyers contributing to the literature. The
next most important pieces were arguably those by John Mark Keyes and
Kerry Wilkins, both former government lawyers at that point. Keyes used
the case of government lawyer Edgar Schmidt to identify and articulate
the limits of loyalty for government lawyers as both lawyers and public
servants.98 Schmidt had sought a declaration in Federal Court that
the Department of Justice, in rejecting his advice, was misinterpreting
legislation that required the Minister to inform the House of Commons
92
Sanderson, supra note 10 at 175–208 (Chapter 4); Martin, “Sanderson Review”,
supra note 84 at 580; Boucher, “Sanderson Review”, supra note 84 at 202.
93
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98
John Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can
Bar Rev 756 [Keyes, “Loyalty”].

2021]

Where are we going? The past and future of Canadian …

337

if government bills were inconsistent with the Charter.99 While in my
view Keyes’ chosen limit—“clear illegality”—is too high from a normative
perspective,100 he provides compelling support for his position as a matter
of law. Wilkins’ contribution was the first consideration of the role of
government lawyers in the Crown’s interactions with Canada’s Indigenous
peoples.101 Perhaps most valuable was his nuanced and thoughtful
explanation and reflection on the interaction between government lawyers
and elected officials and their political staff, and the implications for the
role of government lawyers.102
Also notable in its substantive contribution was the article “Civil
Crown Counsel: Lore Masters of the Rule of Law” by Eric Boucher, a
lawyer with the government of New Brunswick.103 Boucher was the first to
propose specific additions to the rules of professional conduct that would
address government lawyers.104 Chief among these was a duty to “advise
the person from whom the lawyer takes instructions as to the requirements
of the Rule of Law.”105 His important insight was that government should
not be able to contract out of these duties by retaining private counsel,
and thus that his proposed rule should apply both to government lawyers
and to lawyers in private practice.106 Indeed, Boucher argued that the
government cannot retain outside counsel “simply because it does not like
the advice given” by government lawyers: “If government has been told by
the Attorney General that its proposed conduct is contrary to the rule of law,
it cannot absolve itself of its duty simply by relying on a contrary opinion
from an outside source.”107 Boucher also proposed that a commentary
to the rule could clarify the uncertainty around the person or entity to
whom the government lawyer reports up in case of wrongdoing or breach
of the rule of law.108 Boucher anchored these proposals in a variant of the
Tait-Dodek concept of the Attorney General and government lawyers as
“guardians of the rule of law.” In Boucher’s account it is the Crown itself
that is “guardian of the rule of law,”109 whereas the Attorney General is
99
See e.g. ibid at 757–58; Schmidt v Canada (AG), 2016 FC 269 [Schmidt], aff’d
2018 FCA 55 [Schmidt FCA], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38179 (4 April 2019).
100 Ibid at 776.
101 Kerry Wilkins, “Reasoning with the Elephant: The Crown, Its Counsel and
Aboriginal Law in Canada” (2016) 13 Indigenous LJ 27.
102 Ibid at 33–36, 38–40.
103 Boucher, “Lore”, supra note 75.
104 Recall however that MacNair, The Case, supra note 37 had proposed rules of
professional conduct specific to legislative counsel.
105 Boucher, “Lore”, supra note 75 at 482.
106 Ibid at 480–81, 483.
107 Ibid at 479, 479–80.
108 Ibid at 480–81, 483.
109 Ibid at 479.

338

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol. 99

“the exclusive interpreter” or “Lore Master” of the rule of law,110 although
these roles are “symbiotic.”111
In contrast, Michael Morris and Sandra Nishikawa, lawyers for
Canada and Ontario respectively, provided a fairly representative account
of government lawyers.112 Similar to Monahan, their account was rooted in
the role as “guardians of the rule of law” and a duty to the public interest.113
Like Monahan, they were clear that the identity of the ultimate client, the
Crown, means that legal advice must be consistent across departments.114
They did emphasize more than Monahan the status of government lawyers
as public servants and the implications of that status.115
Other than Monahan, the highest-ranking government lawyer
to contribute to the literature during this time was Malliha Wilson,
an Assistant Deputy Attorney General for Ontario, in collaboration
with other government lawyers—including Ronalda Murphy, who at
this time was on leave from an academic appointment. The first piece,
“Professionalism and the Public Interest,” situated government lawyers in
the broader discussion around professionalism.116 It emphasized the role
of government lawyers as counsel for the Attorney General and explained
how the structure of legal services delivery in the Ontario government
reinforces that role.117 The bulk of the article pushes back against
Dodek’s argument that government lawyers have higher professional
duties than other lawyers.118 In identifying government lawyers as
counsel for the Attorney General, as opposed to delegates of the Attorney
General, the article argues that government lawyers do not exercise the
delegated authority of the Attorney General but merely “empower” and
“enabl[e] the Attorney General to discharge his or her obligations.”119
This account is inherently problematic in my view insofar as it relieves
government lawyers of the delegated duties that come alongside delegated
functions. Whether for that reason or otherwise, this account was never
endorsed in the subsequent literature. The second Wilson piece, “Legal
110
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Professionalism in the Twenty-First Century: Government Lawyers as
Accidental Innovators” was an introspective reflection on the pressures
facing the profession.120 While it used government lawyers as an example,
arguably it added more to the literature on professionalism than to the
literature on government lawyers.
Notable during this decade is the vehemence with which government
lawyers pushed back against Hutchinson’s suggestion that privilege
and confidentiality are less important for governments than for other
clients,121 and against Dodek’s argument that government lawyers have
higher professional duties than other lawyers.122 These comprised the
first real dialogue in the literature on legal ethics for government lawyers,
a dialogue in which academics and government lawyers engaged one
another.
This brings me to the somewhat awkward task of evaluating and
situating my own work as an academic with experience in government.
It spanned a range—political activity,123 activism,124 federalism,125 and
reconciliation126—but largely focused on the meaning of loyalty for
government lawyers. I took a strict approach to partisan political activity at
the same level of government, arguing that it was precluded for government
lawyers by the duty of loyalty and only permissible to the extent that
legislation on the public service waived that duty.127 In contrast, I was
more relaxed on non-partisan activism.128 I argued that while a principled
yet simplistic approach would be for government lawyers to avoid all
non-partisan activism, Charter considerations should allow them—at a
minimum— to advocate for a group to which they belong, defined broadly,
120 Ronalda Murphy, Malliha Wilson & Taia Wong, “Legal Professionalism in the
Twenty-First Century: Government Lawyers as Accidental Innovators” (2012) 63 UNBLJ
420 [Murphy, Wilson & Wong].
121 Morris & Nihshikawa, supra note 112 at 178–80; Monahan, supra note 94 at
52–54; Boucher, “Lore”, supra note 75 at 469. See also Andrew Flavelle Martin & Candice
Telfer, “The Impact of the Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government
Lawyers: A Duty of Honourable Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443 at 469–70 [Martin &
Telfer].
122 See e.g. Monahan, supra note 94 at 49–52; Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 24
at 13–17. For a synthesis, see Martin & Telfer, supra note 121 at 453–57.
123 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics and the Political Activity of Government
Lawyers” (2018) 49:2 Ottawa L Rev 263 [Martin, “Political Activity”].
124 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Government Lawyer as Activist: A Legal Ethics
Analysis” (2020) 41 Windsor Rev Leg & Soc Issues 28 [Martin, “Activist”].
125 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation of
Federal Government Lawyers” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 363 [Martin, “Federalism”].
126 Martin & Telfer, supra note 121.
127 Martin, “Political Activity”, supra note 123 at 282–88, 297–302.
128 Martin, “Activist”, supra note 124 at 78–79.
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on matters unrelated to their practice.129 My piece on federalism used a
traditional doctrinal analysis to argue that absent a requirement in federal
law or in the terms of their employment, lawyers for the federal government
can practice without being members of the corresponding law society—
but if they are members of a law society they are subject to its regulatory
jurisdiction unless Parliament passes a law constraining or removing that
jurisdiction.130 I also advanced a proposal, inspired by Sanderson, for a
separate bar for federal government lawyers.131 Perhaps most useful was
my synthesis with Candice Telfer of the debate in the literature and case
law on whether government lawyers have additional or higher ethical
obligations than those of lawyers generally, and the application of that
debate to the place for government lawyers in reconciliation.132 This piece
was unusual in that it was a collaboration between myself as an academic
and Telfer, a lawyer for the government of Ontario. In contrast to Cotter,
Hutchinson, and Dodek, who each wrote foundational pieces and then
essentially moved on to other areas of legal ethics research, my sustained
attention to legal ethics for government lawyers arguably demonstrates
that this is a viable area for ongoing academic research.
While I recognize that my work in this area has been consistently—
others might say stubbornly—doctrinal and Canada-centric, as opposed to
theoretical or comparative, in my view those characteristics are not flaws.
There is room for all kinds of work to contribute to this area of study,
and doctrinal work often lays the foundation for alternative approaches
to legal scholarship. A fair criticism, in contrast, would be that my work
focused heavily on the rules of professional conduct and applied a narrow
understanding of legal ethics as the law of lawyering. As Dodek has argued
in his work on the state of Canadian legal ethics generally, the importance
of codes is “hotly contested” and “legal ethics consists of much more than”
the law of lawyering.133
Other than my work, and a brief note by Micah Rankin,134 there were
only two articles by academics over this time. One was a 2016 piece by
Dodek titled “The ‘Unique Role’ of Government Lawyers in Canada.”135
In addition to recasting his earlier work for a non-Canadian audience,
and incorporating the intervening literature, Dodek here provided a
nuanced discussion of the appropriate role of government lawyers in
129
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public law litigation.136 The other, “A Less Private Practice: Government
Lawyers and Legal Ethics” by Jennifer Leitch, advocates a “justice ethic”
approach to legal ethics for government lawyers.137 Under this approach,
the unique obligations of Crown prosecutors would be extended to
government lawyers.138 Indeed, Leitch proposed amendments to the
rules of professional conduct requiring that “[w]hen acting on behalf
of the Crown in adversarial proceedings, a lawyer must act fairly and
dispassionately to ensure that justice is done.”139 With respect, Leitch’s
proposal, grounded in a single, but admittedly unsettling and compelling
case study, is creative but overbroad and unpersuasive. A narrower claim
about a subset of government litigation would be stronger—for example,
one rooted in the honour of the Crown, parallel to the negotiation context
as I discussed with Telfer. More fundamentally, Leitch collapses the
disputed ethical obligations of governments into professional obligations
of government lawyers, allowing those lawyers to supplant the legitimate
decisions of their clients. If governments are to be constrained in their
legal decision-making, such constraints should come in legislation or
in political consequences at the ballot box, and not be imposed by their
lawyers via the law societies amending the rules of professional conduct.
One of Leitch’s arguments is notable because it is (or should be)
controversial and is, in my view, problematic. Like other commentators,140
Leitch recognizes that for government lawyers, withdrawal effectively
means resignation.141 Unlike other commentators, however, she argues
that this reality is “untenable” and thus that legal ethics should allow
government lawyers—and even the Attorney General—to “avoid” that
consequence by “creat[ing] a space for the government lawyer to adopt an
ethical position that is different from her employer.”142 Quite simply, my
view is that if government lawyers find the implications of their professional
obligations ‘untenable’, they should choose a different practice instead
of torquing those obligations to their comfort. There is an important
distinction between recognizing that government lawyers operate under
multiple legal regimes that do not interlock neatly and relieving them
136
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from core professional obligations because the consequences of those
obligations are severe. The former is critical to empowering government
lawyers to comply with the letter and spirit of both their professional
obligations and their obligations as public servants. The latter would
lower the standards of the legal profession, or at least exempt government
lawyers from them. While this distinction may be clearer in the abstract
than in reality, it remains an important distinction nonetheless. Whereas
Hutchinson argues that government lawyers are public servants first
and lawyers second,143 and whereas Dodek and Sanderson do not rank
or order the layers or sides in their models of the duties of government
lawyers, my starting point is that government lawyers are lawyers first.
I acknowledge, however, that as a matter of law, Hutchinson is probably
correct insofar as for federal government lawyers, federal legislation on
the civil service prevails over provincial legislation on the legal profession
via paramountcy.144 However, at least at the provincial level, my view may
be correct not only as a matter of policy but also as a matter of law—and
would, I assume, be shared by the law societies.
This decade also saw growth in the literature on roles at the definitional
margins of government lawyers, and specifically judicial law clerks and
military lawyers. Joshua Wilner re-entered the literature with “To Be or
Not to Be? Some Legal Ethics for Judicial Law Clerks,” drawing on his
experience as a former law clerk.145 In striking contrast to his earlier
work applying virtue ethics to government lawyers,146 this later piece was
heavily practice-oriented. It addressed both some core issues relevant to
all lawyers, such as confidentiality, and more clerk-specific ones such as
impartiality.147 Wilner anchored his analysis in the relationship between a
judge and her judicial law clerk. However, while he considered many facets
and features of that relationship, in the end he left it as an amorphously
defined, sui generis one.148 Wilner was indeed noncommittal as to whether
judicial law clerks practice law, which raised the question of whether the
concept of “legal ethics” properly applies to them.149 In sharp contrast, I
grounded my analysis of judicial law clerks in the premise that law clerks
practice law within a lawyer-client relationship.150 This disagreement
143
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reinforces the reality that law clerks are at the definitional margins of
government lawyers.
During this time, I also wrote the first Canadian piece on legal ethics
for military lawyers.151 In it, I created a framework that was somewhat
analogous to the Dodek and Sanderson models of government lawyers,
arguing that military lawyers have two “layers” of duties—as lawyers and
as officers—and focusing on the interaction between these layers.152 Like
my other work, this piece was squarely doctrinal.
This decade was the first period in which there was truly explicit
dialogue in the literature, as government lawyers responded to the earlier
work of Dodek and Hutchinson. During this time the literature provoked
some reaction. Nonetheless, even at this stage the literature remained
largely doctrinal, somewhat unimaginative, and relatively undynamic.
B) Who, how, what, why—and so what?
From this assessment of the literature emerge the answers to the questions
I posed above—and a less comfortable one that I have thus far left
unmentioned.
Most of the existing literature has been authored by current or former
government lawyers or by academics with experience in government.
The initial work was largely written by current or former government
lawyers, particularly Deborah MacNair.153 This group grew and persisted
over time.154 It was joined by academics with experience in government,
particularly Brent Cotter, and Adam Dodek, and later myself.155 However,
little of the Canadian scholarship has been written by academics without
significant experience in government. This reality is not surprising, given
that the work of government lawyers, other than perhaps litigators, is
largely hidden to those on the outside. But it is a limitation to be overcome
going forward.

151 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics and Canada’s Military Lawyers” (2019)
97:1 Can Bar Rev 727.
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153 See also Tait, supra note 9.
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What about the how, i.e. approach and methodology? Other than
Wilner’s piece applying virtue ethics,156 the literature is primarily
doctrinal—indeed, its authors and critics might characterize it as
unabashedly or stubbornly doctrinal. This is not surprising given that most
of the literature is by current or former government lawyers, as opposed
to academics who one would expect to be more grounded in approaches
other than doctrinal approaches. Similarly, little of the existing literature
is more than superficially comparative.
As for substantive content, the existing literature both considers
core questions in legal ethics—conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and
privilege—and larger themes of particular note for government lawyers.
The larger themes throughout are the rule of law and the role of the public
interest. More recent work has grappled with what loyalty means for
government lawyers, largely but not solely in the context of Edgar Schmidt.
It is unclear what precisely is motivating the dramatic growth in
this work among both government lawyers and academics. Other than
the pieces dealing with Schmidt,157 none of the literature was an explicit
response to specific events. The apparent general motivation, most
explicit in the work of Hutchinson and Dodek but underlying all the
literature, is that the previously meagre attention to government lawyers
was disproportionate to their numbers and strikingly ignorant of the
special issues that face them. Presumably, government lawyers and former
government lawyers would be the most keenly aware of this discordance.
However, the small number of academics participating in this growth
suggests that legal ethics for government lawyers has yet to be accepted as
a meaningful and legitimate area of study.
Contrast here Dodek’s account of the impetus for the Canadian
legal ethics literature generally. Dodek attributes the initial growth both
to a major revision of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Canadian
Bar Association and to the Supreme Court of Canada’s first major
decision on lawyer conflicts of interest, Martin v Gray—a decision with
a stirring dissent and with major implications for the practicing bar.158
In contrast, there have been only two major Canadian decisions on legal
ethics for government lawyers. The first, Everingham v Ontario (AG),
ended at the Divisional Court level and predated most Canadian legal
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ethics scholarship.159 The second, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta,160 would be applied in some
scholarship on government lawyers,161 but was more often and more
deeply applied to its specific context of Crown prosecutors and to the
Attorney General.162 While the Edgar Schmidt affair has inspired and
affected recent scholarship, the decisions of the Federal Court and Federal
Court of Appeal in Schmidt v Canada (AG) did not address the potential
legal ethics issues and Schmidt faced no disciplinary proceedings (at least
yet), meaning no court or tribunal has pronounced on those legal ethics
issues.163 Thus, the literature on legal ethics for government lawyers has
had fewer prompts than the literature on legal ethics more generally.
Likewise, as I return to below, there have been fewer prompts in Canada
than in the US.
Arguably the most important and publicly visible controversy around
government lawyers in the last decade, other than the Schmidt affair,
received little attention in the media and has yet to be picked up in the
literature.164 In November 2016, an Ontario government lawyer wrote
a letter to the Deputy Attorney General alleging not only longstanding,
pervasive, and extreme harassment, discrimination, and abuse within the
Ministry of the Attorney General—but also that “[the Deputy Attorney
General] and other senior leadership in government ... are fully aware of
this pattern of behaviour.”165 Ironically, this came roughly five years after
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Malliha Wilson had published her
piece on professionalism, a piece in which she painted a rosy picture of life
as a lawyer in the Ontario government:
[T]here is a great deal of accountability as to how staff in government are
treated. The government has workplace discrimination and harassment policies,
online learning modules on accessibility and discrimination, and, perhaps
most importantly, the Ministry of the Attorney General has fostered a norm of
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professionalism and civility amongst its lawyers. The government is also dedicated
to diversity and inclusion.166

The silence in the literature might appear particularly surprising because
this was an era in which the legal profession, in the legal literature and
elsewhere, was deeply embroiled in a debate over civility.167 However,
in my view these events being overlooked is unsurprising, and not only
because of the opacity of government practice. The civility movement, in
both its aspirations and its application, paid perhaps the least attention to
the ways in which lawyers treat their subordinates.
Contrast this relative uneventfulness with the lively events and
literature surrounding the Attorney General during recent years. Not
long after an appalling attack on the Chief Justice of Canada by federal
Attorney General and Minister of Justice Peter MacKay,168 the SNCLavalin affair riveted public attention to the role of the Attorney General
in federal prosecutorial decisions.169
Indeed, the Canadian literature on legal ethics for government
lawyers appears to be both implicitly and explicitly more a response to US
events than Canadian ones. Much of the work mentions John Yoo and the
torture memos,170 which likely dominated the attention and conscience of
the Canadian legal profession, and to a lesser extent the Canadian public,
over this time.
Dodek attributed later growth in Canadian legal ethics literature to
the increase in legal ethics teaching and “the emergence of a new cadre of
scholars prioritizing legal ethics scholarship.”171 These factors may also
be promoting more literature specifically on legal ethics for government
lawyers—but that remains to be seen. There are two possible explanations
166
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for the slow growth in this area.172 One explanation is that Canadian legal
ethics scholars are focusing their work on other substantive areas, such as
civility,173 good character,174 family law,175 solicitor-client privilege,176 or
the related topics of solicitor-client judicial ethics.177 Another explanation
is that there are relatively few legal ethics scholars in Canada, compared
to those in other areas of legal scholarship. In my view, both explanations
carry weight. Put another way, increased output in this area would come
from either (and hopefully both) increased scholarly attention to legal
ethics for government lawyers and an increase in the overall number of
legal ethics scholars. As I will return to below, there will continue to be a
key role for government lawyers writing in this area.
One last question remains: so what? Setting aside the idyllic and
convenient notion that scholarship is a valuable good in itself, and without
getting bogged down in disputes over the definition and measurement of
“impact,” what has this literature achieved? Its practical effect—if any—on
the practicing bar is largely unknowable. Nonetheless, Sanderson’s book
172
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will doubtlessly be an invaluable reference for government lawyers going
forward. Moreover, the adoption of Dodek’s proposal for a professional
responsibility service by the federal Department of Justice is tangible
and impressive. To more symbolic effect, the adoption and rejection of
some of the ideas of Dodek and Hutchinson by Deputy Attorney General
Monahan, and to a lesser extent in the work of Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Wilson, suggests that legal leadership in the government of
Ontario is paying at least some attention to the literature. Insofar as legal
literature can be evaluated by its uptake in the case law, the lack of uptake
can be attributed to the paucity of cases on government lawyering and
is not necessarily reflective of flaws in the literature itself. Insofar as the
impact of literature is to beget more literature, the Dodek and Sanderson
models of government lawyering, which might be fused into a single
Dodek-Sanderson model, have been influential, as to a lesser extent so has
been Tait’s foundational work. All in all, the impact has been moderate at
best.
3. A path forward
In this Part, I consider the potential future of Canadian scholarship on
legal ethics for government lawyers.
In terms of substantive content, there are few if any glaring gaps in
the existing Canadian literature but yet there remains room for growth.
There are several issues, and several roles, that are largely unexplored. As
I identified above, there is little work on the application of whistleblowing
legislation to government lawyers. An idiosyncratic issue is that most of
the lawyers in Canada who bargain collectively happen to be government
lawyers other than management. Government lawyering thus intersects
ethics and professionalism with both labour law and employment law.
While the rules of professional conduct do not prohibit or discourage
collective bargaining, other issues arise. Most importantly, do the rules of
professional conduct on client service and on withdrawal prohibit strikes
by lawyers? Whether the rules do and should do so is a discussion that
incorporates and applies fundamental ethical considerations, including
duties to the client and to the administration of justice. As for roles,
policy lawyers for example have been ignored other than a few pages by
MacNair. There are also numerous possibilities at the definitional margins
of government lawyering, such as military lawyers and judicial law clerks.
These are just some of the substantive areas for future growth. But those
working in this area can and should do more, and strive for more.
With a considerable substantive and doctrinal foundation laid, there
are now rich possibilities for the application of non-doctrinal or alternative
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approaches to legal scholarship. These include legal theory, legal history,
law and economics, and perhaps even law and philosophy. In particular,
I would argue that there is a pressing need for empirical work to better
understand the lived reality of government lawyers and the specific ethical
issues that face them in practice, beyond the few who have published in this
area. Here I echo Dodek’s call for empirical work on lawyers generally.178
A parallel can be drawn here to Dodek’s account of the history of
Canadian legal ethics scholarship, in which he identified two intertwined
“waves.”179 He characterized the first wave as “descriptive,”180 “heavily
focused on the codes of ethics and on law societies’ regulations,”181
and comprised of “treatises and doctrinal analyses.”182 In contrast, the
second was analytical and critical, or what he called “a scholarship of selfreflection.”183 In a similar way, the Canadian literature on legal ethics
for government lawyers is at a moment in which the first-wave doctrinal
work, of which Sanderson’s book represents a culmination, should be
joined by second-wave analytical and critical work. That is not to say that
none of the existing literature is critical, or that there is no need for further
descriptive work. Sanderson’s book, in particular, not only provides a
foundation for critical work but starts towards that work itself.
What about comparative work? While Dodek was emphatic that
Canadian legal ethics account for the “distinctly Canadian context” and
“seek to identify and articulate uniquely Canadian aspects,”184 he also
identified a particular need for comparative legal ethics research,185
specifying the UK and the US as sources of “fruitful inquiry.”186
His nuanced position was that it is better to use foreign content “as
an opportunity for critical self-reflection on the values that underpin
Canadian legal ethics” than as a source of values and rules themselves.187
Dodek’s imperative that Canadian legal ethics be Canadian is important,
but may have been inadvertently caricatured by some commentators in
this area to dismiss the value of comparative work.188
178
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While the US and UK would be the two obvious comparators, it is
important to consider which is preferable. Dodek suggested that Canadian
legal ethics “suffers from Anglo-American confusion” as to whether the
US or the UK is the appropriate source of “inspiration and guidance.”189
However, even if the UK is the better comparator, there is little existing
UK literature on which to draw.190 In contrast, the US literature in this
area clearly outnumbers the corresponding Canadian literature—just
as the US legal ethics literature more generally vastly outweighs the
Canadian. Indeed, Dodek argued in 2016 that “the paucity of attention
to government lawyers in Canada compares poorly with the attention
given to the subject in the US.”191 For example, there is extensive US
literature on government lawyers and whistleblowing192 and on conflicts
of interest and other restrictions for former government lawyers.193 These
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areas are relative weaknesses in the Canadian literature. Not surprisingly,
the torture memos have been a key topic of US research since the turn
of the century,194 and one that inspires helpful hypotheticals in the
Canadian context. There is thus great potential to draw on US scholarship
and to collaborate with American academics and lawyers in the future.
Collaboration with the UK likewise has untapped potential.
Admittedly there is no single path forward. I nonetheless suggest that
a timely move would be to supplement continuing doctrinal work with a
new wave of non-doctrinal work.
While it may sound pessimistic, I would argue that the literature
on legal ethics for government lawyers is at a defining but precarious
moment—a moment of possibilities but also of danger. It runs the risk of
stalling out or, even worse, becoming the worst kind of scholarship that
is merely a running conversation among a handful of commentators who
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20:2 Ariz L Rev 369.
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have little if any interest in, much less impact, on the outside world. To
set out the existing law as the doctrinal work has done is an incomplete
project that will become meaningful and whole if and when that existing
law is pushed further, as primarily Dodek and Hutchinson have pushed
so far. The literature should strive to be more and to be better—while
challenging government lawyers to be more and to be better.
None of this is to denigrate the work so far, and most of all Sanderson’s
singular achievement. The question is whether this is the end, or instead
merely the end of the beginning. Perhaps the best is yet to come.
4. Conclusion: A precarious moment
and a promising future
There has been substantial progress in the Canadian literature on legal
ethics for government lawyers since Tait’s speech less than twenty-five
years ago. Indeed, this is a moment of substantial excitement and growth
but also of precariousness.
There remains lots of space, and indeed a real need, for intensified and
sustained focus on government lawyering by both government lawyers and
the academy. While current and former government lawyers contribute
a richness and a grounding to the literature, they face many constraints
from which academics enjoy freedom. The most obvious constraints
may be confidentiality, privilege, and loyalty, but time and resources
may be even more constraining in reality. There is a real opportunity
for governments to encourage and facilitate increased participation by
their lawyers in informing and shaping the literature about them—but
this will require a change in attitude that embraces transparency over the
current state of relative opacity. While it may still be unrealistic to expect
governments to follow Dodek’s advice to proactively disclose the legal
advice they receive,195 allowing and encouraging government lawyers
to write more about themselves should be more tenable. In addition to
freedom and time, academics are also more likely to have and cultivate
expertise in non-doctrinal approaches. Those academics with experience
in government should encourage their colleagues to enter this area—and
to consider collaborating with government lawyers in doing so. Indeed,
the active participation of current and former government lawyers is a key
strength of the existing literature that should certainly not be abandoned.
The limited attention given to government lawyers in legal ethics
research by academics parallels the limited attention given to government
195
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lawyers in legal ethics teaching in law schools.196 While teaching is beyond
the scope of this article, I would note that increased attention in legal
ethics teaching should, and hopefully will, go hand in hand with increased
attention in legal ethics research.
The limited number of academics working in this area is both
problematic and symptomatic. This relative academic absence may
incorrectly signal that legal ethics for government lawyers is not a
meaningful subject of scholarship, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
My hope is that this may change, in the same way as legal ethics itself grew
to be an accepted area of Canadian legal scholarship. The only apparent
way to drive such change is one publication at a time—but time is running
out. Without sustained contributions by both academics and government
lawyers looms the real prospect of failure as a meaningful area of study.
Such failure, however, is by no means inevitable and indeed is entirely
preventable.
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